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Drift draft destroyers

Cover illustration: The Battle for Green Beach by Dwight Shepler By William B. Kirkland Jr. Preeword by James L. Holloway III Edited by John C. Reilly Jr. Naval Historical Foundation Washington, D.C. 1994 Published: Navy Museum Foundation, a project of the Naval Historical Foundation, Washington Navy Yard, DC, 2002 Contents Foreword V Preface vii Prologue ix I. Ships and Men 1 II. DESRON 18 and LORD OVERLORD 11 III. Assault on the morning 21 at Pointe du Hoc 27 with the 116th RCT 29 with the 16th RCT 35 with the 18th RCT 52 IV. Escape in the afternoon 57 v. The days that followed 71 VI. The End of Line 75 VII. Ex-Scientific Tridents 81 Preface As the 50th Anniversary of the D-Day landings in Normandy is observed, most commemorative events and historical reminiscences are concerned with the experiences of the troops who fought on their land and then regrouped to begin the journey through France until the Reno that gave the Allies victory in Europe. That's understandable. Europe was always considered the Army's main theater of operations in World War II, just as the War in the Pacific was considered the victory of the U.S. Navy. Because of these generalizations, attention to the main contributions of the subordinate service can be easily decreased. The role of the U.S. Navy in the Normandy invasions is an important example of this kind of oversight. The landings in Normandy and the defeat of the German army were tasks of the Army and clearly among its best hours. However, the military victory could not have happened without naval forces moving the armies across the Channel, to put troops ashore on the assault beaches, and then provide the naval firefright that, with close air support, allowed the assault forces to leave the beach. This monograph provides first-hand accounts of The Destroyer Squad 18 during this critical battle on which much of the success of our campaign in Europe would depend. His experience at Omaha Beach can be seen as typical of most U.S. warships involved in Normandy. On the other hand, from the author's research, it seems clear that this squad of destroyers, with their British counterparts, may have had a more crucial influence on the escape of the beach head and the success of the subsequent campaign than was carried out so far. His contributions certainly provide a basis for discussion among veterans and research by historians, as well as a solid professional account of naval action in support of the Normandy landings. Captain Kirkland's manuscript was edited and prepared for publication by Sandra J. Doyle and Wendy Karppi. John C. Reilly Jr. reviewed it in detail, consulting the original sources and inserting notes and amendments as needed, and selected photographs and maps. JAMES L. HOLLOWAY III --vi-- Preface In the summer of 1944, allied armies invaded Europe crossing the English Channel to Normandy. The story was told Times. O O senior commanders give an overview of planning, decisions and execution from a high perspective. From military and marine historians we learn about operational details, and the successes and failures of combat units. Yet other writers, especially those who were there, tell us about the individuals who fought, and some who died, and of their heroism and fears, joys and sorrows, in those desperate days between June 6 and 9, 1944. Thirty-three American destroyers and three Britons were involved on the beaches of Normandy, supported by six escorts of destroyers (DE) and high-speed transport (APD). Eight Ships of The Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 18, with the three British destroyers, were on the front line at Omaha Beach. Destroyer Division (DESDIV) 34 and DESDIV 20 were on the line at Utah Beach. Before the first troops landed Cory (DD 463) hit a mine and sank. After the first hour, the three British cans withdrew on time, and the ninth ship of the DESRON 18, Frankford (DD 497), joined the others near the surf line. This story recounts the events on Omaha beach as seen from the surface and on land, integrated, as well as the unit's records license, and illuminated by eyewitnesses. The goal is to show the intimate relationship between the soldiers of the 1st and 29th Divisions and DESRON 18, a relationship that helped make victory possible on this important landing beach called Omaha. The attack on Omaha beach can be divided into three well-defined engagements, which occurred simultaneously on adjacent landing beaches. In the far west of Omaha, the battle for Pointe du Hoc occupied the 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions, supported by Satterlee (DD 626) and Thompson (DD 627). In the center, on the beaches named Dog and Easy Green, the 116th and 115th Regimental Combat Teams (RCT) of the 29th Infantry Division landed, supported by Carmick (DD 493) and McCook (DD 496). On easy beaches --vii-- Red and Fox, to the east, landed the 16th, 18th and 15th RCTs of the 1st Infantry Division, supported by Emmons (DD 457), Baldwin (DD 624), Harding (DD 625) and Doyle (DD 494). Frankford, the flagship of DESRON 18, crossed the landing area and demonstrated the necessary aggressiveness of these destroyers in their first major battle. The sequence of all three combats followed a similar pattern: mine sweeping, mismatch of transports, prelanding bombings and assault landings in three successive waves. After the waves of assault landed, the destroyers fired on opportunity targets to help the infantry get off the landing beaches. The so-called fire, directed by ground fire control parts, led to the final cleanup of the landing beaches allowing armor and transport to move inland. The progress of each phase of the action was quite different; none followed the prepared script. After three days of battle, 3,000 soldiers from the 1st, 4th and 29th Divisions were victims. Three destroyers, a destructive escort, a heavily loaded torpedo, and numerous numerous aircraft carrier had been sunk. These losses attest to the ferocity of the battle for the beaches of Normandy. William B. Kirkland Jr. Captain, USN (Retired) Alameda, California --viii-- Prologue On the morning of June 6, 1944 James E. Knight, a soldier from the 299th Battalion of Combat Engineers of the 1st Infantry Division, found himself trapped on the rocky shore at Omaha Beach by German artillery and machine guns dug into bluffs overlooking the beach. He and hundreds of other American soldiers were trapped between the defenders' murderous fire and the high tide behind them. In the late morning, Knight saw a destroyer enter the shallow behind him and shoot his head at the German stronghols. Soon he and the others were able to get off the beach and move inland. He remembers the ship as Frankford, and suggested that someone research the facts and see if Frankford alone could have turned the tide of the Omaha landing - and possibly the entire invasion of Normandy. (Knight, 124-26) Frankford, however, was not alone. She was the flagship of The Destroyer Squad 18, commanded by Captain Harry Sanders, and more than one destroyer almost put her bow in the sand to break the German wall at Omaha Beach. The author, Doyle's a military officer, undertook the research suggested by James Knight, and believes he is right in his assumption that naval weapons were instrumental in changing the tide. Eight SHIPS of DESRON 18, plus Emmons and three British destroyers, supported the heroic efforts of soldiers from the 1st and 29th Divisions, and had a large part in initials on the road to victory. * * * In his action report Commander W. J. Marshall, commander of Destroyer Division 36, writes: At 6:17 (H minus 13 minutes) LCT(R)s [British landing ship converted into fire bombing rockets] began firing rockets, soaking the area just inland from the beaches. The fire on this beach was temporarily silenced and the entire area covered in smoke and dust. The troops disembarked and headed to the beach for smoke. --ix-- Baldwin's action report (DD 624) records: 0619-0637: Beach closed in front of the boat wave, firing 1- and 2-gun (the two front 5-inch weapons) into the designated target area and ahead of the troop landing. Minimum beach range of 1,800 meters. And doyle (DD 494): 0630: Hora'H. Indirect fire started on the target... to help clean the beach exit now completely obscured by smoke and dust. Carmick Deck Log (DD 493) records: 0647: German Shore Battery opened fire on this ship. 0650: German Coast battery silenced by the main battery of this ship. No damage resulting from enemy fire. This one seemed like a promising opening, but within half an hour things started to go wrong. Confused by the loss of visibility in the smoke, about half of the coxswains landing craft lost their way. Pushed by the eastern part of the current, many landed east of their designated objectives; some troops arrived ashore outside the landing area landing German gunners, defending the five beach exits (the so-called five draws or openings in the bluffs facing the beaches between Vierville and Cabourg), hit the first wave. Demolition crews suffered from the German fire and were hampered by the tangled condition of the beaches. The destroyers entered the second phase of their work, shooting at targets behind the beach. It was almost 0900 before it became clear to the destructive captains that something was wrong. Doyle fired a German gun overlooking the east exit of Colleville. Carmick saw American tanks parked in the Vierville draw and, in cooperation with the tankers, made the first hole in the defenses. Wave landing vessels of follow-up boats began to grind around the beach as their coxswains searched for places to land. When Frankford, with Captain Harry Sanders on board, crossed the beach around 9:00 a.m., things started to happen. All the destroyers were sent to the beach to help break through the defenses. This was the time of the crisis. Satterlee was picking up enemy weapons at Pointe du Hoc. 1. McCook reported that she dropped an enemy weapon on the edge of the cliff, and that another flew into the air. 2. Vierville was taken by 1100. At the eastern end of Omaha Beach Frankford, Doyle and Emmons were hitting hard at three exits as Baldwin exploded into German guns near Port-en-Bessin. Baldwin was shot twice by light artillery, no casualties. At 10:43 a.m., McCook reported capturing a radio message saying that U.S. troops were advancing. Harding was leading his way, dropping saves until the tie toward Colleville. By 1600, St. Laurent-sur-Mer was occupied by troops from the 29th Division. Colleville was in a vice, mounted by 1st Division troops approaching two draws. The Germans surrendered the next morning. As this team of destroyers came to this particular place in history, and made the landings at Omaha Beach succeed, is the story to be told.

1. Often incorrectly identified as Pointe du Hoe in many publications and documents. 2. There was no artillery at Point du Hoc on D-Day. Six 155 mm weapons were assembled there to command Omaha and Utah beaches, making their capture an essential feature of the attack plan. When the Rangers struggled to get to the point, they found the battery empty; the weapons had been moved inland and replaced by wooden dolls. McCook's gunners wouldn't know that. --xi-- In the years after World War I, the United States Navy gradually wore out the hundreds of four-stack, flushdeck destroyers built to keep the sea lanes open during World War I. The first classes of destroyers, authorized in 1898 and commissioned in 1902-1903, weighed from 408 to 480 tons. The initial service demonstrated the value of the new and the need for more displacement for a satisfactory operation with the fleet. At the time the United States Entered World War I, the Navy had 67 destroyers in commission, with seven more on the way. All had a high forecast and ranged from 720 tons to 1,000. The war caused the rapid construction of flushdeckers from 1,090 to 1,190 tons. Two hundred and seventy-three of these were established between 1917 and 1919. By Armistice 37 were in service; five were cancelled after the end of World War I. The other ships were in commission in 1922, although post-war budget cuts soon sent most to the reserve. These first destroyers were built for speed, endurance and navigability, designed to keep pace with the warships and cruisers of their time and launch mass torpedo attacks on an enemy's battle line. The main battery guns - 4-inch caliber of 50 in all but some of the flushdeckers - were secondary armament for their torpedo tubes. The destroyers were equipped with underwater sound equipment and depth charges during World War I to fight submarines, and in the post-war years they were called to screen the battle line of the submarine attack. These 1,100 tons were the legacy that led to the Benson and Gleaves classes of 1,620 to 1,630 tons and the 2,100-ton Fletchers of World War II. --1-- In the early 1930s, it became clear that new improved design destroyers were needed. Despite their speed, the four-pipers were notorious for lack of cruising radius and for wet decks in even moderate seas. In severe weather, the front gun could not be manned. The torpedo tubes on the main deck were often unusable by salt water. There was no adequate submarine detection equipment on board, no room for the new underwater sound devices, and limited storage for anti-submarine weapons. Thus began an evolution of the design and limited construction of new classes of destroyers. Each year after 1931, some ships were established, initially limited by the standard displacement ceiling of 1,500 tons imposed by the London Naval Restraint Treaty. Standard displacement was a legal concept established by the Washington Treaty in 1923; measured the displacement of a fully manned, armed, supplied and ready-to-sea warship, but without fuel or spare boiler feed water. The first of the new destroyers were eight Farraguts, 1,365-tonners completed in 1934-35 with two stacks and new 5-of-5 caliber 5-inch guns of 38. Sixteen mahans of 1,450 tons and eight leaders of the Porter class of 1,850 tons entered service during 1936-1937. In 1937, two Duntlaps, almost sisters of the Mahans, appeared with two 1,500-ton Gridleys and eight similar bagleys. Between 1937 and 1939, five class 1,850-tonners single-cell somers with improved steam plants commissioned. Two more Gridleys appeared in 1938, followed in 1939-1940 by ten stacked Benhams and twelve Sims-class ships on a slightly expanded displacement of 1,570 tons to allow for improvements. To improve dryness forward, a problem with previous flushdeckers, the new ships were built with high forecast. Torpedo torpedo tubes placed above the main deck in the later destroyers for the same reason. The boiler captures were smothered in one or two pipes to gain valuable space on the central deck. In the previous classes of destroyers, the four boilers were grouped into two firerooms, with the engine room — two Sims-class engine rooms — aft. Keeping the firefighters together and combining the pickups allowed more space on deck, but a blow in the right place could disable either the firefighters, or both engines, and leave a dead ship in the water. The 1938 tax program included the first eight of what would become two large classes of two-battery destroyers, 1,620 tons with its two firefighters and two engine rooms arranged in alternating sequence and so connected that a ship could operate in any half of its engineering plant. This split-plan arrangement meant an additional weight, but also gave a better chance of surviving a hit torpedo. These ships were designed to carry five 5-inch weapons and three quad-torpedo tubes, with 50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns (AA), and became the beginning of the Benson class (DD 421). The designers added more AA machine guns, placed light armor around the bridge and director of weapons, and replaced the quad-torpedo tubes with two new quintuple assemblies. This arrangement looked better than the original design, and the Navy decided to incorporate these changes into the first eight ships. Meanwhile, a new high-temperature steam plant had been selected for the 1939 destroyers, and was retroactively included in two 1938 ships that were built by Bath Iron Works. The new two-year forklifts have now begun to fall into groups, some built with the new high-pressure machines and others with low-temperature plants. The 1941 construction program consisted entirely of new Fletcher-class destroyers. By 1940, the pace of war was heating up in Europe and China, and over 72 standard Benson ships were ordered during 1940 and early 1941. Starting with Bristol (DD 453), later class ships were built with four 5-inch guns instead of five to make room for new top weights. Combinations of construction programs, armaments, and engineering plants led to some confusion in class designations during the war years. Ships of the original design of 1938 were called the Benson class. The high-temperature ships of the 1939 program were first called Ivermore class (DD 429); since the DDs 423 and 424 were built to the same standard, they eventually came to be called the Gleaves (DD 423) class. The first four-gun ships were originally called the Bristol class; over time, all five-gun ships lost a weapon to improve stability and open for anti-aircraft guns, and Bristol's distinction has lost its meaning. The 96 ships built for Benson's basic concept eventually came to be known as the Benson and Gleaves classes, the difference that is in their machines. As the war continued, they all became tactically equal and operated together It was from the Gleaves class that The DESRON 18 was selected. (Friedman, 95-107) In 1940, two shipbuilding contracts were left to the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Corporation. The first, on September 9, 1940, summoned five Gleaves-class ships with hull numbers 493-497. The second, on December 16, asked for five more numbered DDs, 624-628. These 1,630-ton destroyers were originally manned by 18 officers and 220 men who served the four 5-inch double-caliber 38, 40 mm and 20mm automatic AA pistols, and five 21-inch torpedo tubes with K machine guns and stern rangers for depth charges. The ships weighed 2,500 tons in total cargo displacement and were 348 feet long with a 36-foot beam and a maximum cauldron of 17 feet and 5 inches. They had four oil-overheated boilers that delivered 825-degree steam to two turbine-fanct turbines producing 50,000 horsepower to drive them at test speeds of 37 knots. They were equipped with sonar as well as search radar and fire control. (Fahay, 20-27) --3-- McCook (DD 496) in February 1944. Her tow-one color scheme was replaced by standard camouflage, but otherwise she looks like she did outside Omaha beach. Satterlee (DD 626) at the anchor in Belfast Lough, May 14, 1944, with Baldwin (DD 624) and Nelson (DD 623). Thompson (DD 627) replenishes the Battleship Arkansas (BB 33) during testing operations, April 21, 1944. Like her sisters DESRON 18, she is painted dark blue at the height of the main deck, haze gray above it. As D-Day approached, landing craft like these LCI(L)s mounted and loaded into English ports. Desron 18 would soon be helping many of these crafts fight on their way to land. --5-- The first of the DESRON 18 ships to join the fleet was Carmick (DD 493), commissioned on December 28, 1942. It was a sad, gray day when she set her first watch, but it was raining. Those of us in the pre-commissioning details of the remaining ships watched with envy. We were looking forward to going too. The other ships followed Carmick in commission, at intervals of about a month, until Thompson (DD 627) was commissioned on July 10, 1943. These nine ships were assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, and became Destroyer Squadron 18. Doyle (DD 494) was commissioned on January 27, 1943. It was snowing in the Pacific Northwest a week or so ago. Seattle wasn't used to snow, and public transportation was almost over. Still, the full crew ended when the commissionment to the mast and Lieutenant Commander Clarence E. Boyd took command. On February 2 Doyle left Bremerton for San Diego. There are about 1,040 nautical miles from Cape Flattery, on washington's northwest coast, to Point Loma in San Diego. This is a race of 48 at 22 knots of cruising speed. But Clarence Boyd had other ideas. Captain A. L. Gebelin, doyle's then executive officer, recalls that once the ship had arrived at Cape Flattery, Boyd ordered chief engineer Sam Rush to make the turns. Doyle passed The Flattery Cape abeam to the port around 1730. He He already drank. By 2345, Cape Deception and the mouth of the Columbia River were at Abeam and the West Sea Border Management Reporting Office (MRO) defied Doyle's speed of advancement. Captain Boyd didn't hear very well in the middle of the night. At 13:00 the next day the course was changed to south-southeast and Doyle cleared Point Reyes. When the ship passed through the Golden Gate, she received another challenge from the MRO. Once again the message has been misplaced. Boyd, after all, was a very experienced captain with several destroyer tours on his record. If he were to take this in danger, he needed to know how fast and how far. The passage was made in 30 hours, with time to kill San Diego waiting for daylight to pass through the port's defense networks. The days of February were intense times of repression. It was in progress at 7:00, went through the nets, and continues with exercises until dark. There was rarely a day to bring up endless paperwork. In March, Doyle left San Diego for Panama on his way to New York. Carmick and Doyle met in New York, and Endicott (DD 495) arrived shortly thereafter. In April 1943, the three destroyers sailed as part of the screen of a slow train connected through the lower latitudes to Casablanca. In that harbor, the French battleship Jean Bart was, on a uniform keel, but severely destroyed by the main battery of the battleship Massachusetts (BB 59) the previous November, while disembarking the Army in North Africa. This was the first sure sign that we were at war. --6-- We were back in New York in early June, and we turned on another train to Londonderry, Northern Ireland. We made four round trips across the Atlantic before the end of the year. It was a dull duty. We pick up sonar contacts, and chase in circles, dropping depth charges, but usually to no avail. McCook (DD 496) and Frankford (DD 497) eventually found us, and DESDIV 35, the first half of DESRON 18, began to form. The squad's commodore, Commander W. K. Mendenhall Jr., occasionally rode Doyle or one of the others. The little squad staff was a tight fit. The captain moved to his small sea hut to make room for the commodore in his cabin. The staff beat us in the infantry camp. Despite the inconvenience, we and the commodore met. Aboard Frankford, the crowd and discomfort went to duty, as she was the head of the designated squadron. The small irritations that the rest of us suffered from time to time were endemic to the leader. Commodore Mendenhall was a tough driver who aimed to have the best squad of destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet. We have all come to your challenge; Frankford went up a little higher. The Division spread as we helped bring down new major warships in the protected waters of Trinidad in the British West Indies. Doyle the cruiser Quincy (CA 71) and did aircraft guard service for the carriers Bataan (CVL 29) and Wasp (CV 18). The other ships on DESDIV 35 did the same. We learn fast, steamy steaming maintenance station with the big boys. While operating with Bataan, Doyle was targeted by his small air group. One day, a Grumman TBF torpedo bomber launched a practice fire, which would have been a sure killer. It struck Doyle between frames 130 and 132 on the side of the door, leaving a large dent in his hull cladding, then plunged under the keel and hit the starboard propeller. Doyle trembled long before the black gang had to stop her. That ruined the cruise. It took four days to get Doyle into drydock in Charleston, South Carolina, Navy Yard. In late February, she was back in Casco Bay with a new propeller. Here, on March 24, 1944, the nine ships of The DESRON 18 met for the first time as they left the builder's yard in Seattle. --7-- All squadron commanders were graduates of the Naval Academy; your class year and final classification are shown. DESRON 18 CAPTAIN Harry Sanders, USN 23 (VADM) Frankford (DD 497) CDR James L. Semmes, USN 36 (CAPT) DESDIV 35 CAPT Harry Sanders, USN Carmick (DD 493) CDR Robert O. Beer, USN 32 (RADM) Doyle (DD 494) CDR Clarence E. Boyd, USN 28 (CAPT) Endicott (DD 495) CDR Wilton S. Heald, USN 27 (RADM) McCook (DD 496) LCD Ralph L. Ramey, USN 35 (CAPT) DESDIV 36 CDR Wm. J. Marshall, USN 25 (VADM) Baldwin (DD 624) LCDR Edgar S. Powell, USN 34 (CAPT) Harding (DD 625) CDR George G. Palmer, USN 30 (RADM) Satterlee (DD 626) LCDR Robert W. Leach, USN 33 (RADM) Thompson (DD 627) LCDR Albert L. Gebelin, USN 34 (CAPT) Captain Harry Sanders had served as an aide to Admiral Ernest J King in 1941, when King was commander-in-chief, Atlantic Fleet. Sanders went to sea after Pearl Harbor when King became commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet (COMINCH). He had just left the Mediterranean after commanding the Destroyer Squadron September 13, 1943 until February 1944, including the landings at Salerno and Anzio. Captain Sanders relieved Commander Mendenhall as COMDESRON 18 in mid-March 1944. On March 26, Commander James G. Marshall dismissed Commander Clarence Boyd from Doyle's command. During the previous six months, all commanding officers of DESRON 18, except Commander Palmer at Harding (DD 625), were replaced. Nineteen and forty-four brought other important changes. Most of the lieutenants who became department heads in commissioning had been ordered to re-struct or replaced by this year's ensign, now lieutenants (junior degree). At Doyle, for example, the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander A. L. Gebelin left to take command of Thompson. He was relieved by Lieutenant E. J. Ted Sweeney. Where the commissioning complement included six lieutenants and two lieutenants (jg), it was now in three lieutenants and eight lieutenants (jg). Of the eight original ensign, four remained as lieutenants (jg), and ten new ensign were The security room, which was packed with 18 souls, now had 21 officers. By ordering four doyle officers on board were graduates of the Naval Academy. Por Por she had two. This was a kind of official turnover happened on all nine ships in the squadron. The changes among the enlisted were as dramatic as. In Doyle Walter Foley was promoted from --8-- first class shipfitter to Justify Carpenter and moved to the country from an infantry. Jack Gwin of Texas was a second-class train driver's teammate on Doyle's commissioning team, and was now a chief petty officer. Ed Miller came on board as a second-class torpedo companion and was first class the hard way, doing buyers [Bureau of Naval Personnel] promotion exams. With only a few exceptions, the sailors were drafted reserves from Kansas, Illinois, North Carolina and the Bronx. Few had been seen salt water, but they became excellent Navy men who learned their jobs well and performed excellently when it was due. On April 18, 1944, DESRON 18 departed Boston as part of Task Group 27.8 under Rear Admiral Morton L. Deyo (Commander Cruiser Division 7) on the Tuscaloosa heavy cruiser (CA 37), with veteran battleship Nevada (BB 36), bound for England. --9-- DESRON 18 arrived in Devonport by Plymouth, south-west England, on April 28, 1944. None of the officers or men, except perhaps the commodore, had any idea what they were to do that summer; but these were now a skilled and well-educated group of young people. The nine captains were 34, about a few years old. Few others were over 30. For two and four, ships classified daily for drills and high-speed maneuvers off the coast in the Eddystone Light area. At the end of the day, back in the narrow of Plymouth Sound, each took a mooring buoy and often picked up next to a British counterpart. This thoughtful gesture, undoubtedly justified as a means of getting to know allied teams before sharing a battle, had a sharp side effect. As soon as the mooring lines were stuck than our british opposite numbers were on board for a coffee and a quick ride. A return visit followed to join the mother, courtesy of Her Majesty George VI. After dinner we met on the American ship for ice cream and a movie. When the film was made, non-observers again visited the British for a more honest whiskey. And so spent a few pleasant days of Anglo-American camaraderie when the shore leave was limited. According to one story, there was an exception to the routine of catching the buoy. Frankford, with comdesron 18 shipped, has always been designated a pierside pier. Commodore Sanders assumed that this was in deference to his rank and position. Lieutenant (jg) Richard Zimmermann, (USNA '43) Frankford's officer ci[c] [Combat Intelligence Center] thought otherwise. This young bachelor met a lovely British --11-- WREN (Royal Navy Service Phyllis Saunders, which was posted in the Port Director's Office. She had a lot to say about the daily docking tasks. She also knew that Dick could get to the beach much earlier than any mooring buoy on the river. And so it was. Three of the British British DDs with DESRON 18 were Melbreak, Talybont and Tanatside, Hunt Type III class of 1,087-ton, 264-foot-long escort destroyers on the waterline with four 4-inch weapons and light AA weapons, designed as anti-aircraft and anti-submarine patrol vessels. Their 19,000 horsepower gave them about 25 knots. (Lentonkamp, Colledge) They operated on DESRON 18 in Omaha Beach. Before May 1, the squad moved to Weymouth Bay, behind Portland Bill. On the night of May 3, May 18, 18 was underway for Phase I of Exercise Fabio I, tracking transports of the 11th Amphibious Force toward Slapton Sands. Five days earlier, this had been the site of a tragedy. During an invasion rehearsal in the early hours of April 28, the day we arrived in Plymouth, German torpedo boats, called E-boats by the Allies, torpedoed two LSTs from the Utah Beach landing force whose British escort had been deactivated and could not leave port. Because of a command of Rear Admiral Don T. Moon, the commander of the Utah force, he was never notified of the gap in his screen. This attack cost us LST-507, LST-531, and 638 American soldiers and sailors. (Morison, XI, 66-67) To prevent this from happening again, DESRON 18 now escorted 16 transports and 21 LSTs from the Omaha Beach landing force. (Doyle war diary) At the beginning of 5 May DESRON 18, minus Thompson, graduated out of Plymouth to escort nine transports north to Scotland. Tactical Command Officer (OTC) was commander of Transport Division 3 in attack transport Charles Carroll (APA 28). The convoy also included Henrich (APA 45), Samuel Chase (APA 26), Anne Arundel (AP 76), Dorothea L. Dix (AP 67), Thomas Jefferson (APA 30), Thurston (AP 77), and British soldiers Empire Anvil and Javelin Empire. On May 9, the DESRON 18 was again underway for Slapton Sands for drilling shelving on the coast. On the 12th Carmick and Endicott escorted the ammunition ship Nitro (AE 2) to Dunoon Bay, Greenock, Scotland. After Slapton Sands, the rest of DESRON 18 went to northern Scotland for coastal bombing and became familiar with our Fire Control Parties (SFCP), each consisting of a Navy officer and an Army officer, with a small army radio team. --12-- DESRON 18 was based on the River Clyde. Sometimes we dock at Dunoon Bay, Greenock, kilbrannan sound on Sanda Island, or via the North Channel in Belfast Lough, Northern Ireland. The squadron exercised in every conceivable evolution. We practice defense against e-boats in something called video exercises. We fired aa practice in towed sleeves from Black Head, Northern Ireland. We carried out bombings off the coast with our fire control parties, and escorted the big boys while practicing. On May 25, DESRON 18 was ordered south as an escort for twelve transports. To the squadron, minus Frankford, left Belfast Lough and joined the convoy. We found Destroyer Division 119 in company. These were new ships of the Allen M. Summer class: Barton (DD 722), Walke (DD 723), Laffey (DD 724), (DD 725) and Meredith (DD 726), all ordered between late December 1943 and mid-March 1944. Captain William L. Freseman (USNA '22), COMUSDRON 60, took command and formed us into tight columns on both flanks of the soldiers' column. The commodore led the gang at Barton from a station about 2,000 meters ahead of the formation; the rest of the DESDIV 60 deployed in both arcs. Desdiv 35 took station to the port of the train, while our DESDIV 36 deployed to Starboard. Down the Irish Sea we went, heading south on the swept channel at about 25 knots. By 4am the clock had just changed when we passed the Abeam from St. Govan to the harbour and prepared to take the 90 degree formation left to the Bristol Canal. Suddenly, a stain appeared on Barton's radar screen, identified as a ship to the north in the center of the narrow channel. We intercepted right at the turning point. The solitary was the American Export Line Steam Exhibitor, who had no idea she was facing a fast 25-ship naval convoy and maintained course and speed in the center of the canal. The destroyers at least had radar and could feel the real world of the racetracks around them as we whipped through the left turn as they crowded at less than half the width of the channel. Sleep-destroying captains, suddenly called to the bridge, had to quickly understand the tactical situation and judge whether the OOD [Deck Officer] had made the correct move. I remember that when my boss at Doyle suddenly realized that I was in parallel with the nearest transport at a distance of about 100 meters, his heart must have jumped, but he left the command to me while watching Endicott and the freighter ship for about 150 meters on the side of the harbor. Doyle's war diary says the Exhibitor passed our starboard side, which would put it between Doyle and the line of soldiers. I was deck officer (OOD), and remember it as stated above. This is confirmed by correspondence from Jim Arnold, who was McCook's OOD. --13-- Endicott, in front of us, did badly. Captain Heald found his way to the wing of the very dark starboard bridge. He took a look at the troop ship near board, asked for full rudder on the left - and cut through the Exhibitor's arch. It was a good clean move. Endicott lost his bow; the freighter survived. The rest of us ran in the canal, head over to the German e-boats, rumors that it was. Endicott dove to and estimated damage, and then limp in Milford Haven, Wales, escorted by Carmick. On May 28, Endicott transferred ammunition, and his secret orders to Operation Neptune [the naval part of Overlord] to Emmons (DD 457), commanded by Commander Edward B. Billingsley. Our squad mate, Endicott, missed the action at Omaha Beach. We deliver our transport to Weymouth Bay, behind Portland on May 27 and anchored in 0132 in dense fog. On the night of the 28th Portland was the target of a heavy German air strike. DESRON 18 have for short stay, ready to anchor and sort if necessary, fearing that the Germans would see multitude of ships anchored in the light of Portland Bill. We held our fire and watched as the weapons on the ground shone against the bombers held in the spotlight beams. We heard the bomb explosions and saw the flashes, followed by flames of things on the ground burning. McCook had a near error that knocked down the foremast's SG surface search radar antenna and blocked the director's 5-inch Hf firearms control radar and optical rangefinder against the stops. We never fired a shot, but we knew we were in danger. * * * The Western Task Force (Task Force 122), under the command of Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk in the heavy cruiser Augusta (CA 31) and carrying the U.S. lieutenant general Omar Bradley, First Army, it included more than 200 ships of all kinds. TF 122 was organized on 17 125, U Assault Force, destined for Utah Beach under Rear Admiral Don P. Moon. TF 124 was Assault Force O, headed for Omaha Beach under rear admiral John L. Hall, with Army V Corps Major General L. T. Gerow. Admiral Hall and General Gerow were on the command ship Ancon (AGC 4), a sophisticated amphibious headquarters ship whose very existence was classified. Rear Admiral C. F. Bryant's Bombing Group included the warships Texas (BB 35) and Arkansas (BB 33), with four light cruisers - the British Glasgow and Bellona, with the French Montcalm and Georges Leygues - and the eight remaining ships of the DESRON 18 with their three British companions. The Escort Force, which provided the screen, included three more American destroyers and two Britons, with three American destroyer escorts and two French frigates. --14-- DESRON 18, minus the damaged Endicott with Emmons added, has been assigned to provide fire support to land the V Corps at Omaha Beach. To allow mine sweepers to enter and exit before the scheduled start of naval bombardment, we left Portland at 1:00 p.m. on the 4th, going into a rough, windy seas rising in the English Channel. After weeks of quiet weather in the summer, a storm fell from Greenland, and nearly crippled the invasion. General Eisenhower made the decision to postpone the landings for 24 hours. In the middle of the night, as we approachEd Point Z, the turning point to normandy, we received an urgent recall. We made a turn to get back to Portland before dawn; just one more exercise. The invasion force included several Rhino ferries, pontoon barges powered by large outboard engines. These could only make five knots when the wind was in the foreday. They had been dispatched earlier, and were turning south towards Normandy in the middle of the afternoon. A new ensign on the DESRON 18 team clocked in during the night of June 4, when the message from the Supreme Headquarters ordering the 24-hour delay was received. He was reluctant to wake the commodore. Captain Zimmermann, a CIC officer from Frankford at the time, recalls that when Captain Sanders, earlier on the 5th, read the message board he realized the Rhinos were about to turn south. He urgently ordered Frankford and another to work up to the speed of the flank, intercept the rats, and turn them back. The movement was repeated during the night of the 5th, and this time we did not go back. General Eisenhower's meteorologists detected a clear spot behind the first weather front, and he gave the order to go ahead. We fit into that narrow breach and put the armies on the ground. * * * Five destroyers on the west flank of the Omaha Beach main landing provided fire support near Captain W. O. Bailey's Assault Group O-2, landing the 116th Regimental Combat Team of the 29th Infantry Division, taking position to the right of the boat's runway. The attack group included the American attack transports Charles Carroll and Thomas Jefferson, with its British counterpart, Empire Javelin. The Pointe de la Percee was at the western end of Omaha Beach, with the gloomy Pointe du Hoc more than three miles away. Pointe Du Hoc would be taken by the 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions, supported by Satterlee and HMS Talybont. The 116th units to land on Dog Green, Dog White and Dog Red beaches were, in order, companies A, G and F; Company E would land --15-- NORMANDY BEACHHEAD WITH SECTORAL ASSIGNMENTS TO U.S. and U.S. Forces. SITUATION THE ENGLISH CHANNEL 0030(B) June 6, 1944 --17-- in Easy Green. These units were supposed to take two of the beach exits, one leading to St. Laurent and one to Vierville-sur-Mer. A Ranger company landed on Charlie's beach, west of Dog Green; most of Charlie faced steep cliffs and was not scheduled for landings. Six destroyers in the eastern end of Omaha were supporting the 0-1 strike group under Captain E. H. Fritzsche, USCG, with orders to land the 16th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 1st Division, Colonel George A. Taylor USA, on easy red and FOX GREEN beaches, covering the three east [beach] exits to Saint-Laurent, Colleville and Cabourg. (Morison XI, 130) Destroyers included Samuel Chase, Henrico, and the British Empire Anvil. The center of Omaha's landing beach was between easy green and easy red, and this marked the line between the 16th and 116th Regiments of the 29th Division. The E and F companies of the 16th RCT were scheduled to land at Easy Red, with companies I and L for Fox Green on the left. Fox Red Beach was further left toward Port-en-Bessin. Like Charlie Beach, he faced steep cliffs and was not scheduled for landings. Each regimental landing front was about 3,000 meters. Two companies landed less than 50 meters from each of the four designated points on the beach. Each infantry company had 180 officers and men with added supernumeraries; the 32 men for each landing craft filled six of the vehicles and 36-foot personnel (LCPV) and assault landing craft (LCA). Just ahead of the infantry were 64 special DD tanks (duplex unit), Army M-4 Sherman with propellers added to locomote through the water, and a screen screen around the top hull to keep the water out and provide flotation. Imaginative, but not tested. Right Right the assault groups would come landing craft of 157 feet, infantry (large), or LCI(L), with the Headquarters of the Division, Combat Battalions of Engineers and Naval

disorganization, with most troops trapped of obstacles under enemy fire, surrounded by burning vehicles, dead and wounded. Hansen could report no progress in the scale of bluffs between strengths where almost then a handful of men under improvised leadership, facing enemy fire and minefields, had begun up to the relatively helpless slopes. In fact, Omaha's many accounts would tell of the countless cases of courage under lry, which gradually turned the tide sometime after 11 A.M... Small groups of six to ten men, motivated by the example of a handful who under ... Fire... attacked past enemy positions, began advancing in a single file through minefields toward bluffs with heavy weapons, tanks, jeeps, or other equipment. Meanwhile, General Clarence Huebner, commander of the 1st Division, ordered the destroyer stewers to return to the line to direct fire against enemy weapon positions [General Huebner had no command authority over naval forces]. As the morning fog began to rise, naval bombardment accurately improved German targets to provide relief. (Eisenhower, 270) * * The 2d BLT of the 18th RCT found a box of tablets still in action on the right side of exit E-1. The tank fire supported an infantry attack, but this was unsuccessful at first. The naval coast fire control group contacted a destroyer off the beach, and coordinated its action with the soldiers' attack. The case was very well timed; the destroyers' weapons, firing just a few feet over the crowded beach, reached the target around the fourth round and the pill box surrendered. ... Thus, around 1130, the last enemy defenses before the E-1 tie were reduced. (Omaha Beachhead, 83-84) –53-- Frankford fires against pillboxes in the e-1 tie at 1021, 1036, 1045 and 1100 before moving west. Doyle fires at targets on E-3 at 11.00, delivering a call of fire requested by the SFCP in 1124 and 1145, fires a machine gun placement observed in 1205. Thompson fires at targets at Easy Red in 1151 and 1155, and then turns west. 1109: A damaged landing craft sank near Harding. Four injured men were taken aboard. 1142: Contacted the Costa Fire Control Party. Ordered to fire on German troops. . 9. 590 yards. Fired two salvos, spot firing ordered by SFCP. (Doyle Action Report) 1145: Ordered to fire at the Command Post by the SFCP. I fired three salvos of weapons. Ordered to spot firing. (Doyle action report) 1151: Started shooting at the suspected fortified house on the beach 'Easy Red'. 1155 Cease fire ... Shots ordered to hit, unknown effect. (Thompson action report) 1155: Rocket Guns [320mm rocket launchers] observed shots at beachhead from [a road junction behind easy red]. He's moved fire to the target immediately. 1213 Ceased firing. 30 rounds of ammunition spent. Target completely silenced. (Thompson Action Report) 1200: Engineers Clearing Mines draw E-1. This became the main funnel for movement off the beach. (Omaha Beachhead, 84) Spotted enemy machine gun in pit at the top of the cliff. ... seeing beachhead. He started the fire with 20, 40 and 5-range 2600 yards. Target eliminated. (Baldwin action report) 1205: Observed machine gun machine gun firing on the hill side at Easy Red beach about 100 meters from the beach. Fired three salvos, target destroyed. (Doyle Action Report) 1215: Landing force trying to use Dog Green Exit apparently paraded by snipers or uncolocalized batteries. THOMPSON moving toward dog Green Exit [D-1, the vierville draw]. (Thompson action report) –54-- 1217: Began shooting at numerous houses and ravine placements leading sea from vierville sur Mer church. Destroyed 6 houses (a three-story) and stone wall that houses snipers and beach guns. (McCook Action Report) 1223: Demolition of all houses and structures that command the Green Dog Exit has begun. (Thompson Action Report) 1250: Cease fire. Effect of indeterminate fire. Tanks still ready to use Dog Green Exit. (Thompson action report) 1304: opened fire against possible placement of machine guns on top of the hill. ... about 500 meters from the beach [Easy Red]. (Doyle action report) 1308: ... communication has been established with the designated coast fire control group. The SFCP ... designated a target at the formigny road junction. ... [abou 2.5 miles inland]. At 1.20, he fired a salvo. He was ordered by the SFCP to cease firing due to his inability to observe shooting, a target that requires a landing site. Immediately after receiving orders to cease firing, contact was lost with the SFCP and was never recovered. (Frankford Action Report) 1311: Established contact with SFCP. ... Ordered to stand by [sic]. Lying out dog green beach. (Thompson action report) 1355: Weapons observed firing from trees at the top of the hill to the east of the landing area [Fox Red] I fired four complete salvos. All shots fired in the vicinity of the target area. (Doyle action report) –55-- 1330: General Eisenhower, based on reports from Navy observers on the critical situation in Omaha, authorized allied air forces to bomb through clouds and fog near the beaches. The proposed attack did not occur. (Eisenhower, 271) At the same time, General Bradley reflected: Our communications with the forces that assaulted Omaha Beach were scarce and nonexistent. Of the few radio messages we hear and the first-hand accounts of observers on small boats reconscoring near the shore. I gained the impression that our forces had suffered an irreversible catastrophe, that there was little hope that we could force the beach. In particular, I considered evacuating the beach head and directing the accompanying troops to Utah Beach or the British beaches. ... Then, at 11.M. I received an emotional message from Major General Leonard T.J.Gerow: 'Troops previously trapped on the beaches... advancing heights behind the beaches. The situation across the beach was still serious, but our troops forced one or two of the draws and were inciting the interior. Based on the Them. I gave up any thought of leaving Omaha Beach. (Bradley, 251) 1355: Weapons observed firing trees from trees at the top of the hill to the east of the [Fox Red] landing area, fired four complete salvos. All the shots burst burst proximity to the target area. ... He fired two salvos of weapons at the German infantry [at Fox Green] at the request of the SFCP. (Doyle action report) –57 -- Army doctors treat a victim on Fox Green Beach. The heavy casualties for the attack troops would have been much higher, but for THE DESRON 18 and other fire support ships. Troops disembark from an LCPV at Omaha Beach while loaded dukov carry supplies and half lanes towing light weapons. At this point, the fighting has moved inland, and the troop files go to the bluffs above the beach. The shot stand leaves hobson's deck (DD 464) full of 5-inch cartridge boxes. Four days after D-Day, landing craft and a Rhino ferry dump troops and vehicles on the landing beaches. This massive build-up of force during the first few weeks of invasion tilted the balance toward the Allies and led to the eventual escape of the beach head. During the early afternoon we were called to the left end of the beach [Easy Red] near exit E-3 and in company of u.s.s. FRANKFORD took under fire a placement on the right side of the valley that seemed to be preventing our troops from advancing. After covering the side of the hill with fire, our troops advanced and in about half an hour returned with about 20 prisoners. (Carmick action report) 1350: Around 1350 received ... message from LCI 538 : From the info show party: 'Believe in church bell tower [in Vierville] to be enemy artillery observation post, you can blow it up' ... HARDING then called ... Advanced observers... requesting permission to open fire. ... [Permission ... was granted. ... in 1413 opened fire in ... 3200 meters and church completely demolished, ex-40 shots, each shell of which fell on target. Major REED of the Rangers later confirmed ... that this target contained 4 enemy machine guns. (Harding action report) 1555: ... this ship was deployed from the Fire Support Group and proceeded according to ... the operation plan to add essence emblematic functions of the Commanding Area Screen. (Frankford action report) 1600: St-Laurent-sur-Mer occupied. (Morison, 150) 1612: Fired 142 40 mm bullets in injured... cliff machine gun beassing beachhead [Fox Red]. Target neutralized. (Baldwin Action Report) 1635: Shot four salvos ... in cliff positions. ... German soldiers coming off the cliff... showed white flag and ... ship flashing light and traffic light. ... Ordered troops to march east and surrender. (McCook Action Report) 1715: Army DUCK [DUKW] came alongside in hidden. I received them on board for medical attention. 1745 Landing craft loaded with wounded came alongside. Injured men brought on board for medical attention. The boat included survivors of LCI 487, LCI 93, and U.S. Army personnel. (Doyle action report) 1740: Two landing ships came alongside in and transferred six wounded men on board. Three are transfusions per doctor -- 60 -- official. Everyone gets medical help. All... were transferred to [another landing craft] in 2025-2025 additional transfer to a hospital or transport vessel. (Baldwin Action Report) 1750: COMEDSDIV 36 changed its command from Satterlee to Harding. (ComEDSDIV 36 action report) 1812: Started shooting at the church hidden in gully [sic] behind the beach [Easy Red]. (Thompson action report) 1822: Displaced target for red roof building to the right of vierville church. 1827: The target exploded. (Thompson action report) 1836: Fire shifted to snot at the point[le] de la Perce Cease fire. Slot caved in. (Thompson action report) 1839: Obtained ... to exchange stations with USS 'SATTERLEE off point[and] du Hoe [sic]. (Thompson action report) 1854: ... received orders to ... fire for two minutes at Colleville Church, reach of 3500 yards, which was [sic] fulfilled. In 1857 they ceased fire, a church severely battered. ... In 1935 he again received orders... To... fire again ... in Colleville Church and to spread fire around the area. In 1937 he opened fire again. In... 3800 yards, scoring numerous blows in the church and area. ... It is believed that this church was being used as an observation post for mortar fire, as the beach at this time was apparently being bombed from the interior. (Harding action report) 1900: 1st command post of the Infantry Division established on the ground. 29th CP Infantry Division had landed in 1705. (Morison, 152) 1913: Fired a salvo of four five-inch guns into the damaged tower of the church of ... Colleville, also under fire from EMMONS. The Army has ordered them to cease shooting colleville as a target of opportunity. (Baldwin action report) 1930: Received visual dispatch from the Ranger group at Point[le] du Hoe [sic] requesting boat to evacuate wounded.elayed to CTF-124 [Commanding Task Force 124, Omaha assault force command] over the radio. (Thompson action report) –61-- 1954: Began shooting at ... (fortified house), Chateau de M. le Baron. First save a direct hit, target destroyed. Thompson Action Report) 1957: Enemy soldiers observed crowding abandoned machine gun nest on hill to east landing beaches. He fired three salvos, men and a positioning weapon destroyed. Doyle Action Report) 2000: Combat Engineers completed a fifth exit from the beach, a new road from the end of Fox Red to the east, and started a road from the Fox Green (Exit E-3) to Colleville draw. By this time, traffic was moving inland from the beach. (Morison, 151) General Gerow left the command ship Ancon to establish V Corps headquarters on the beach. His first message to General Bradley read: Thank God for the United States Navy, 2053: Changed course west. ... Emmons about 500 feet ahead observed shots fired at possible weapon placements at the top of the cliff about 3,000 feet east of the landing beach. Several seen ahead of Emmons and close on board. Opened fire with main battery and 40MM to help emmons. I fired 11 salvos. No more... shot was seen from the target area. Doyle action report) We had our first narrow escape. ... One of the others [Emmons] opened up in ... a box of tablets when when from an undetermined position, 88mm projectiles began to burst to her stern. ... At this point, the enemy battery turned its attention to us [Doyle]<it. ... His first salvo fell to the stern, but soon gained more precise range. For two scary minutes, he pumped shell after shell within bare feet of us. Two screamed between DOYLE's batteries and hit the water 25 meters from our starboard beam. Others whistled just in a stressful lurch. Our weapons continued to fire. (Bernard) 2109: Splashes, probably from 75MM shells, seen in both arches near the board, about 25 to 50 yards. Flashes of weapons seen from German patrol boat inside [Port-en-Bessin] breakwater previously fired. He opened fire with complete salvos, covered area around the boat. Direct blows impossible because of the sea wall. ... Enemy troops... in the vicinity of the boat seen abandoning positions. Doyle action report) –62-- 2100-2320: (Darkness). During this time deliberately fired five inches saved in ... port defenses of Port en Bessin (also sighted [battleship] arkansas main battery on the same target), machine gun pit on the cliff... concrete shack covered by radar ... Semaphore tower... Bunker... retractable anti-aircraft weapon placement. Doyle action report) 2120: Emmons traversed by four salvos of weapons. Source of unknown weapon fire. (Doyle Action Report) 2206: Sunset. (Doyle action report) *DESRON 18 had trained hard with the assigned coast fire control parties. We worked together at Slatton Salls and again in Scotland. These brave teams should land with the troops in the first waves, move the point squadrons, and call the target coordinates to the destroyers. Action reports from DESRON 18 and other writers tend to the success of call fire operations [missions fired at the request of observers on the ground or on aircraft]. We noticed several call fire missions performed by Frankford, Carmick, Doyle and Thompson; more such missions were fired later. Note especially the Rangers' initiative at Pointe du Hoc to plan ahead with targets and call fire by flashing light. The men of these teams risked their lives, and some gave up on them, to have this effort a success. We owe them special recognition. 1710: [SFCP] fired on a battery bombarded the beach at Exit E-1 on Fox Green Beach. ... Considerable time was lost because the target ... was in an area believed to be occupied by our own troops. The ship opened fire shortly after the SFCP repeated the target's coordinates twice. Repeated points ... were given. The fire was, of course, of little effect. The SFCP finally said that it could not see the target clearly and that they were more or less guessing about the stains. The ship was able to fire directly at the target and the Furnished... an accurate description of it. After a few salvos of direct fire... rapid fire was requested and delivered for two minutes. The ceasefire was given by the SFCP and they signaled that they were closing and advancing. Advancing action report) –63-- 2030: Started shooting at the SFCP target... Bunker. Fire is not effective. 2033 Shifted fire for ... Pillbox [at point du hoc] ... Effective fire. (Thompson Action Report) 2045: Responded to the Assault Force Commander's request for emergency support to the Ground Fire Control Corps. ... in the enemy concentration on ... range of 6200 yards. Successful mission. (Baldwin Action Report) 2230: Received visual dispatch from Point[le] du Hoe [sic] Rangers giving coordinates of 7 targets to be called by flashers at night. The Luftwaffe was hidden all day, except for the only classification of two planes at 9.00. Every night, once it got dark, Goering's boys were brave. On the night of June 6th, we had some action. 2316: I noticed a flame fell on the water about 200 meters on the bow of the harbor. He tried to sink him with rifle fire. Numerous flares also fell towards the transport area. (Doyle action report) 2320: Enemy planes spotted flying low toward the transport area. Ships in the transport area opened fire with machine guns. About 2327 a low enemy flying plane dropped a bomb pole 150 meters into the starboard radius. (Doyle Action Report) 2330: Heavy air strikes in the vicinity of force O transport area: counted two ships hit by bombs, five aircraft shot down in flames. (McCook action report) 2337: Observed enemy plane went up in flames. (Doyle action report) 2340: A JUB8A [Junkers Ju.88A medium bomber] spotted about 2000 meters away running straight on this dead ship ahead. Elevation about 2000 feet. The fire was not opened, but the LCG(S) [British landing vessel] converted to fire support and designated LCG(L) and LCG(M); there was no LCG(S)) opened fire. The plane changed its course to the left and fell three... Bombs... nearby or at lcg(S). No damage was caused by this ship. ... Several enemy aircraft races were made over the bay. Many ships opened fire and three planes, considered enemies, -- 64 -- were shot down. Intermittent fire from enemy coast batteries and beach bombing continued throughout the night. Contact was maintained with... Shore Firecontrol Parties who said they'd let us know if they needed us. (Baldwin action report) Light air strikes on the transport areas occurred on the night of D/D+1. No enemy aircraft came close enough to carry fire. A German pilot was pulled from the water, but died within an hour of serious internal injuries. (Emmons Action Report) As the midwatch eased on board Doyle the fourth master of the watch wrote: 2359 ammunition spent during the last 24 hours, 558 rounds of 5 A.A. common, 156 rounds of 5 ammunition loaded with common dye [projectiles carrying a colored dye for use in the shooting fall]. There are no victims for the or for any ship's equipment. (Doyle deck registration) By nightfall, the situation had swung in our favor. Personal heroism and the U.S. Navy carried the day. We had until then about 35,000 men and held a piece of beach full of corpses five miles long and about a mile deep. Ripping this splinter from the enemy cost us possibly 2,500 casualties. [No exact accounting was reached]. There was now no thought of giving back it. (Bradley, 252) * As D-Day came to an end most of the five regiments of the 1st and 29th Divisions (V Corps) were on the ground. Some army artillery was landed in the late afternoon, but saw little action that day. Troops were on a line ranging from a few hundred meters to a mile or more. Vierville had been busy before noon; St-Laurent, where the Germans fortified individual houses, was taken at 4:00 p.m. Colleville was taken, but the Germans maintained strengths until the next day. (Morison, 150-151) Rangers were dug at Pointe du Hoc. It was reported that no 8th Air Force bombs had landed on the beach. Due to the low layer of clouds of the morning, the Air Force ordered a 30-second delay in the drops of instrument-controlled bombs to ensure they would not reach the landing craft approaching the surf line. (Morison, 124) The fierce opposition came from the German 352d Division, a regular army unit under the command of Lieutenant General Dietrich Kraiss, ordered to the Caen area to reinforce the Coastal Divisions a few weeks earlier. By noon, General Kraiss had informed Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt that the invasion beach was under control and sent his reserve regiment to counterattack the British beach. At midnight, however, he reported that his entire division was compromised and might be able to perform another day, but needed reinforcements. Clearly, the near tragedy in Omaha was mostly confined to the eastern end of the landing beaches; more precisely, for Fox Green and for Fox Red, which had not been scheduled for landings, but ended up being used anyway. On Fox Green and Fox Red the boats docked on the beach. The assault companies were scattered when they entered under the cliffs, and the Germans had these well defended. Jim Arnold, McCook's artillery officer, wrote his memories of an event, probably on Exit D-1 in Dog Green: As I scanthe cliff, I thought I had seen smoke coming out of what appeared to be swallow holes in the face of the cliff. I got permission from the Captain to shoot off the cliff, and we did just that, two four-gun salvos. The cliff exploded to reveal a honeycomb interior and German soldiers, weapons and supplies went down the rest of the cliff into the sea. I, an artillery officer in Frankfurt, recalls that his captain, James Semmes, decided to take the ship for a closer look. With the tide in his favor, and sailing by fathometer, he took his ship so close that the optical rangefinder went against the steps [in elevation 400 to 400 yards. Here was an American light tank, sitting on the water's edge, that shot something on the hill. We immediately proceeded with a 5-inch salvo. The tank tank opened his hatch, looked round at us, waved, fell back into the tank, and fired at another target. This event, reported in Frankford's action report in 1036, occurred near Exit E-1 in Easy Red. I was Doyle's artillery officer, and recorded an event that occurred at 11:00: I stepped 8000 meters from Easy Red beach [the trunk says Fox Red, which I believe is correct]. Observed positioning of enemy machine gun. ... Fired two half salvos. Target destroyed. Army troops began to slowly advance up the beach hill. The saved salvos were 5-inch mounts 1 and 2 [Doyle's front gun supports], shot almost straight over the bow, one shot at a time. The first anti-aircraft shell hit the face of the concrete casemate just below the narrow opening of the crevice and chipped the concrete. The second went through the crack and detonated in the German weapons room. At the top of the hill was a boat machine gun. It was fast, too. Thompson spent the morning in the Charlie Beach area, firing an gun at radar antennas, recalls Captain A. L. Gebelin, USN (Ret), then its commanding officer. Her deck record notes that while shooting at a nearby building in 1043, it exploded and triggered a series of detonations toward the edge of the cliff, as if a ammunition depot had been hit. At 10:52, Captain Gebelin took his ship to the east looking for targets. Just before noon, fire was placed in a suspicious fortified house in Easy Red. This corrects Thompson's position at about 1100. At that time, she was back at Dog Green trying to demolish all the houses around Exit D-1. Emmons was shooting at targets in Port-en-Bessin from about 1000 by noon. Baldwin's deck record reports that at 11:04 a.m. she was ordered to close the beach in the Fox Red and Easy Green area to face snipers besieging assault troops. From these records we can very well put the destroyers of DESRON 18 during the most critical part of the battle, between 0900 and 1600. The record is also clear that Carmick and McCook opened the dog green beach exit by 1000, and that Vierville was taken by 1100. The easy red exit was opened by Frankford, and others, by 1140. Doyle reports that Fox Red's F-1 exit opened around the same time. All the ships present in the DESRON 18, with Emmons, fought to make this possible. General Bradley wrote that by the end of the day, 23,000 men had landed in Utah Beach. The 4th Division had pushed six miles inland. The casualties were gratifyingly mild: 197 Utah Beach was a piece of cake. Omaha Beach, however, was a nightmare. Even now it brings pain to remember what happened there on June 6, 1944. (Bradley, 248-49) Once the wall was broken, desron 18 ships turned to serve the wounded and survivors of destroyed landing ships. Harding was the first, in 1024, when his medical officer, Lieutenant (jg) E. P. (MC) took his show to meet injured men on a drifting landing craft. He returned in 1515 with two of the most serious. Frankford took five wounded in in 10:50 a.m. Harding took four more in 1109. At 16:00 Emmons took six wounded and 18 survivors of lci(L)-93. At 5:45 p.m. Baldwin picked up six wounded. In 1715, an army dukw came alongside Doyle with 12 wounded; at 5:40 p.m., an LCPV brought 24 survivors of two LCIs. The men on the boat were suffering. The wounded went to the infirmary room, where the mess table served as an operating table. The ship's doctor, Lieutenant D. T. Rendel, was a pediatrician. He had only two men to help him, but the survivors of a sunken LCL included Army doctors. They helped Doc Rendel who he was operating, and bandaged the wounds of others. These wounded comrades spent the night in the officers' bunks. There were churches, with bell trees, in Vierville, St-Laurent and Colleville. The destroyers avoided shooting them on the orders of General Eisenhower. But at the end of the day, Admiral Bryant ordered the ships to fire, as the Germans not only used the towers to observe the beaches, but also placed mortars and machine guns on them. Jim Arnold of McCook recalls that one exploded, probably from stored ammunition. Around 2:00 p.m. Harding in Dog Green, he shot the church in Vierville and severely damaged it. Around 1812 Thompson shot after Easy Red at the church in St-Laurent. The church in Colleville carried the weight; was fired four times by three different ships off Fox Green. Emmons fired first in 1815. Harding was next in 1855. In 1913, Emmons, with Baldwin, struck again. Samuel Eliot Morison says this was a surgical work on the bell tower, as seen by French eyewitnesses. It must be said, to be fair, that some Germans held out in Colleville until the morning of June 7, and must have used the church bell tower as much as they could. --68-- D+1 When the D-1 began, the air strike that had begun before midnight on Day 6 was still in progress, and lasted until about 0100. Doyle recorded a tremendous explosion in Port-en-Bessin in 0022, and wondered if our bombers had scheduled a blow or if the Germans were blowing up an ammunition depot. Carmick ran out of ammunition before midnight and retired to the anti-submarine screen, replaced at sunrise by O'Brien. From 0440 Thompson dealt with a call to the fire after another of the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc. By 6:00, her ammo was almost gone, and she was replaced by Harding. Thompson rushed to Portland to refuel, and Plunkett (DD 431) came in to fill the gap. Comeddiv 36 ordered Harding to send a motor boat [26-foot general utility boat transported by destroyers and many other ships] to the beach to evacuate the Rangers' vehicles; the boat was destroyed in the rocks. The comodoro pressed the landing craft for the task, as well as to deliver ammunition and supplies. At 2:29 p.m., Harding hit an unmarked obstruction and the two propellers. At 16:42 Doyle received a call order from the SFCP on a target, said to be German troops, a thousand meters inland on the road from Colleville to Around 5:40 p.m., lci survivors on board from the day before were transferred to LCI(L)-487, found riding on the anchor and recovered from --69-- yesterday's damage. The wounded were removed by LST-285, the medical guard. In 1930 Doyle was out of ammunition, was relieved by Murphy (DD 603), and went out to the screen. Shortly after darkening transportation Susan B. Anthony (AP 72), loaded with troops, hit a mine on utah beach and sank. Most of her people were saved. D+2 The next day, June 8, began with another air strike. Comeddiv 36 saw two planes down. Doyle's 40 mm machine gun officer reported two planes passing by at 1:40 a.m. About 0150 Meredith, on the utah beach screen, hit a mine. It was towed in the morning, but early the next day a German bomb would shake her so much that it would sink; destructive victim number two. In D+2 Thompson and Satterlee returned from England. McCook ran out of ammunition and left for England at 5:40; she was relieved by Elyson (DD 454). At 8:03 a.m. Glennon (DD 620) hit a mine on utah beach. Two days later, she became victim number three when she was sunk by German artillery. Between 0920 and 0925, the Rich Destroyer Escort (DE 695) set off three German mines as it entered to help Glennon, and was torn to pieces. Their losses and injuries totaled 162 of the 215 souls on board. This was victim number four, destroyers' last victim, Atlantic Fleet, in Normandy. Doyle was scheduled to sail to Portland, but was diverted by orders to dock near the flagship Ancon and face passengers. At 9:23 a.m., when Rich was exploding, Rear Admiral Cook and Major General Handy came aboard. Doyle closed the beach between Port-en-Bessin and Pointe du Hoc before departing for South Weymouth. These were the same visitors from Washington who were aboard Harding on D-Day. Later this day Harding was called in for a special shoutout at Grandcamp-les-Bains, and again later in the town of Maisy. Baldwin came out on to the screen in 1930 with little ammunition. When night fell, the destroyers on the screen anchored to avoid trampling mines brought down by planes overnight. * * * -70 -- D+4 This day, June 10, began with another air strike. Thompson was nearly hit by a bomb around 4 a.m. and fired back, claiming a death with an assist from other screen destroyers. Doyle's war diary says a German plane passed by on board at 4:35 a.m. and was brought under fire with 20 mm weapons. Carmick reports four separate attacks as of 4 a.m., with two medium bombs and two glider bombs [Henschel Hc.293, radio-launched weapons first used in 1943 in the Mediterranean] landing at 1,000 meters. One of them, going directly to the ship, received extensive interference and was suddenly seen diving into the ocean. At 04:44 Carmick fire in a HE 177 [Heinkel He. 177 bomber], took a blow on the second salvo, and had to unload the third through the muzzle toward a clear clear in the water. The German fell 500 yards; aft a crew member was picked up by a PC patrolling [submarine hunter] and taken to Ancon. Earlier in the day, Satterlee returned from England. Comeddiv 36 transferred his streamer to her and sent Harding back to the shipyard in Plymouth to pay attention to his damaged propellers. D+5 When June 11 began, another e-boat attacked. Thompson helped repel this by firing stellar projectiles to illuminate the night for British steam cannons [small patrol ships armed with torpedo tubes and light weapons]. After that, things got quiet for the ships of DESRON 18. Thompson recorded notoriety on this day. During the afternoon of the 11th, she had been ordered to Portsmouth, England, and a special party came on board at 6:30am on the 12th. The guests were Admiral Ernest J. King, General George C. Marshall, General Eisenhower, and General Hap Arnold, accompanied by Colonel Jimmy Gault of Eisenhower's team. Thompson took them to Omaha Beach for lunch with Generals Gerow and Bradley, and returned them to Portsmouth at dinner time. The story is told by Captain Gebelin, then Thompson's commander. On the way back Admiral King seemed in a great hurry. Sitting in the captain's chair on the bridge, King wondered aloud how fast these new destroyers could go. I took the tip, called the front engine room, and --71-- said to the chief engineer, 'Pour it, Chief. You touch the curves; we will respond from the bridge. We worked Thompson up to 42 knots and did Portsmouth in feedback time. According to King's biographer, the rush came because the Admiral had a dinner with Churchill on the special train back to London that night. King arrived on time; the Prime Minister was not. He and the British chiefs visited the beaches of Sword, Juno and Gold in a British DD at the same time thompson was equally involved. The delay on the British side was a distraction at Churchill's request; he wanted to get into a personal call for the Germans. He ordered his destructive captain to find some enemy along the coast and run for a quick shot. Once that was done, the British DD went to Portsmouth, but it wasn't in Thompson's file. (Buell, 456) --72-- While the DESRON 18 remained on the line outside Normandy during June and July, the heavy action was over. In August, the squadron moved to the Mediterranean and became involved in Operation Arnil, the landings in southern France. In September, we were back on train service. Desron 18 was dispersed, never again to operate as a combat unit. These nine ships survived submarine torpedoes in the Atlantic when they did not survive, armed the Germans on the Atlantic wall, and avoided mines and aircraft weapons when others had not, but did not have the honor of going against the Japanese together. Before 1944, Harding was in a shipyard being converted into a with a new hull number (DMS 28). This meant removing the 5-inch rear gun and installing winches and other massive sweep equipment clutter. Massive ships for this mission were needed in the Pacific, and DESRON 18 was chosen to provide some of them. Carmick, Doyle, McCook and Thompson soon followed; Doyle was stabbed in May 1945. Captain Harry Sanders was on deserved ground service in Norfolk in April of that year. Squad 18 was no longer. Several commanders spoke through the story saying how difficult it was for destructive captains to know where their own troops were in a situation like June 6. We express our concern for General Handy in our living room during the beach trip to South Weymouth. He patiently explained that this lack of critical knowledge has plagued -- 73 -- gunners throughout history. I wondered if smoke or flares could be used to communicate, and he replied that the troops were already overloaded with equipment. One of the most serious issues was the lack of communication between the beaches and the chain of command. General Bradley wrote that D-Day was for me a time of severe personal anxiety and frustration. I was stuck at Augusta. Our communications with the forces that stormed Omaha Beach were scarce and nonexistent. From the few radio messages we heard and the first-hand accounts of observers on small boats reconnoitering near the coast, I gained the impression that our forces had suffered an irreversible catastrophe. (Bradley, 251) Shaft (Superior Seat of allied expeditionary forces) received a report at 8:00 a.m.: Two destroyers in front of the landing ship; this event had taken place at 4:00. By 0815, the beachmaster had stop vehicle landings at Fox Green and Easy Green. News of this apparently reached General Bradley aboard Augusta, near the beach, at 10:00. Doyle's deck record in 1102 recorded that army troops seem then begin to advance slowly again after she fired at defenses that were landing the troops. Eisenhower, 270, notes that General Huebner wanted the destroyers to order him back on the line. We had never left the line, and we were still shooting at everything in green-gray that moved. At this hour, the commanders of the 16th and 116th Regimental Combat Teams were on the ground in command of their troops, and had been for three hours. Vierville had been taken at 11:00. At that time, General Bradley admitted that he was seriously considering leaving Omaha Beach and sending the follow-up troops to other beaches. Later, he told Marshal Montgomery that one day I'm going to tell General Eisenhower how close he was in the early hours. (Bradley, 251) A curious event was Major Hansen's 10:00 trip to the beach on a landing craft by order of General Bradley, to find out how things were going and report back. Remember that it was 11 miles from the starting line to the beach, and Augusta was farther. An hour and a half later Hansen came back and reported that disaster is coming. After evaluating this report, Bradley reported to Eisenhower that the was still critical. (Eisenhower, 270) We thought the dispatcher had left with the Spanish-American War. I suggest that, from the records, it can be seen that Captain Sanders (COMEDSON 18) knew, around 9:00 a.m., that there were problems on the beach. Once Frankford closed the beach he could see more, and could better report conditions to Admiral Kirk and General Bradley, than could one - 74 - great jumping to water level on a landing craft. Maybe no one thought to ask him. We were under radio silence, and there was a reluctance to get on the radio, but why this serious collapse happened is not explained in any of our sources. It seems clear that message traffic was to travel along the chain of command, and there were no shortcuts to be taken. A real tragedy would have happened if the Allied air forces had been able to comply with Eisenhower's 1330 order to bomb the beaches. Landings began at 6:30 a.m. and stopped around 8 a.m. Captain Sanders was at the scene at 9:00. It was 0950 before Rear Admiral Bryant in Texas broadcast his TBS radio call in a clear voice that everyone could hear. By this time, the DDs were being hit - Cory had fallen. Major Hansen returned from his boat trip at 11.30, and General Huebner ordered the DDs back on the line. It is possible that the collapse was aboard the command ship Ancon, where Admiral Hall and General Huebner shared space? Sergeant James E. Knight, of the 29th Division of Combat Engineers, wrote to the Frankford crew: There is no doubt, at least in my mind, if you had come as close to me as you did, exposing yourself to God only knows how much, that I wouldn't have survived that night. I truly believe that in the absence of that damage you inflicted on German placements, the only way any GI would leave Omaha was on a mattress cover or as a prisoner of war. (Knight, 126) Sergeant Barton Davis, 299th Combat Engineer, wrote to say: How Do I Remember 'Your Ship Getting So Close. I thought then how I do now that it was a brave thing to get so close. Your ship not only knocked down the pill box, but also the mortar positions above us. ... I always thought it would be great to tell the captain that ship how grateful I am. ... (Personal letter to Captain James Semmes. Co of Frankford) General Bradley later wrote that I must give tireless compliments to the U.S. Navy. As in Sicily, the Navy saved our skins. Twelve destroyers moved near the beach, not taking responsibility for shallow waters, mines, enemy fire and other obstacles, to give us close support. The main batteries of these gallant ships have become our only artillery. ... When he landed that night to establish his V Corps command posts, [General] Gerow's first message to me was exciting: 'Thanks to by the U.S. Navy.' (Bradley, 251) Colonel S.B. Mason, USA, chief of staff of the 1st Division, wrote the following letter to Rear Admiral Hall after an inspection of the German--75 German--75 in Omaha. They should, he said, have been impregnable: But there was an element of the attack that they could not parry. ... I am now firmly convinced that our naval fire support has led us in; that without this shooting we possibly could not have crossed the beaches. (Morison, 149) Mason went on to note that the Omaha landings differ from those that the 1st Division had done in North Africa in that which we were found on the beach. I looked at the destruction of German pill boxes, fortified houses and weapon positions, and in all cases it was evident that the navais had worked on them. ... If we ever have to do another of these jobs, we will all expect good luck to be teamed with the 11th Amphibious Force, the American part of the Normandy landing force] for planning and execution. ... General Huebner agrees on the above ... (Morison, 149) The German generals were not in any mood for their praise of naval artillery. Field Marshal von Rundstedt said the fire of his warships was a major factor in hindering our counter-attacks. It was a big surprise. General Blumentritt, his chief of staff, said allied officials who questioned him did not appear to realize the serious effect the navais had on German defenses. Field Marshal Rommel, on June 10, reported that our operations in Normandy are tremendously hampered ... For ... The... superiority of the enemy air force... [and] the effect of heavy marine weapons. (Morison, 169) * Some bronze star medals and some letters of praise went to commanding officers, executive officers and other officers from other ships. Artillery officers received praise almost a year later. Of the 36 Navy Unit Citations issued to DDs and DEs during World War II, only six went to the Atlantic Fleet. Three of them went to work in Anzio, one for action on the Italian coast, and another on the Algerian coast. Woolsey (DD 437) was the sixth destroyer, honored by North Africa, Salerno, Anzio and southern France. There were no commanders from the Navy Unit for Normandy. Of twenty-one citations from the Presidential Unit for DDs and DEs, two went to four pipers who directed ground troops in North Africa, and seven went to hunter-killer task units in the Atlantic. The others were all for service in the Pacific. There were no citations from the Presidential Unit for Normandy. Ten years after D-Day, Admiral Kirk told Samuel Eliot Morison that his greatest asset had been the resourcefulness of the American sailor. --76-- The destroyers risked grounding and shelling fire to support the troops on the beaches. Courage was in abundance; but, as the Admiral said, it was the resourcefulness of young sailors, coxswains, junior boat officers, and the captains and artillery officers of the 'cans' who made the courage and training count. (Morison, 152) -77-- [Blank] --78 VII Ex Scientia Tridens The record makes it clear that the DESRON 18 made holes in the Atlantic Wall behind the hardest landing difficult already found during the war. It was not the failure of the destroyers who left Omaha Beach full of boat and tank wreckage. Nor was it a failure of the destroyers that let so many of our young people dead and injured on the beaches. That no allied destroyer was lost outside Omaha, as happened in Utah Beach where four were sunk, does not mean that they were not attacked by bullets, bombs, torpedoes and heavy artillery shells. The destroyers had the same mines to be careful, and the same shallow waters and super tides to aggravate the risk of stranding. They worked together and helped each other; the record is clear about that. Desron 18 never failed in its duty on Normandy or Omaha Beach could have been lost, and it wasn't. It is difficult to say how many more tombs would have been filled, and how the invasion of Fortress Europe would have fared, without the efficient and effective performance of these nine destroyers. There is no doubt that DESRON 18 broke the German wall on Omaha beach in actions above and beyond the call of duty. The ships and sailors who manned them deserve to be better remembered. --79-- References Bernard, Tom. 64 hours of battle. Yank. The Army Weekly. June 18, 1944. Bradley, Omar. The Life of a General. Simon and Schuster, 1993. Buell, Thomas B. Master of the Sea: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. Little, Brown, 1975. Eisenhower, David. Eisenhower in War, 1943-1945. Random House, 1986. Fahy, James C. The ships and aircraft of the American fleet. New York: Victory Edition, Friedman, Norman. U.S. Destroyers: An Illustrated Design History. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. Knight, James E. The DD who saved the day. 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In addition to my personal experiences as Doyle Artillery Officer, I also referred to letters or personal interviews of the following: Arnold, Jim, McCook Artillery Officer, Davis, Barton A., Sergeant, 29th Combat Engineer, Gebelin, Albert L., CAPT, USN [Ret.], Executive Officer Doyle and later Commander Thompson, Holt, Richard J., Mr. Satterlee, Keeler, Owen, Frankford Artillery Officer, Knight, James E., E., 299th Combat Engineers, whose article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1989, inspired me to write the history of DESRON 18. Sweeney, E.J. Ted, Executive Director Doyle. Zimmermann, Richard, CAPT, USN (Ret.), Cic Frankford officer. --81-- More than seventy-five years ago, Comodor Dudley Knox wrote at the U.S. Naval Institute about the glaring deficiencies in collecting and preserving the Navy's written records. Knox's article on Our History and Traditions On The Run gave rise to the Naval Historical Foundation in 1926 under the patronage of the Secretary of the Navy. From its initial focus on safeguarding the Navy's material culture, the NHF has developed into a non-profit organization dedicated to preserving and promoting the entire range of naval history. Today, in addition to providing much-needed support to the Naval Historical Center and the Navy Museum, the NHF brings together oral histories of Navy veterans from World War II to the Cold War, and publishes articles and sponsors symposia on important topics of naval history. To provide greater public access to historical collections of Navy art, artifacts, documents, and photographs, the NHF provides historical photo search and reproduction services through its Historical Services Division. The Foundation receives donations to support its programs. The program is also open to all who share the Foundation's objectives. For information on contributions, adome, and other services provided by the Foundation and its services, please contact: Naval Historical Foundation 1306 Dahlgren Avenue SE Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5055 (202) 678-4333; fax (202) 889-3565 info@navyhistry.org --83-- --83--

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